From “Punishment of Virtue” / Associated Press
Afghan President Hamid Karzai (right) and Gul Aga Shirzai

The Punishment of Virtue
Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban
By Sarah Chayes

THE PENGUIN PRESS; 386 PAGES;

Reviewed by John Brady

According to conventional wisdom, both the U.S.-led military campaign against the Taliban and the early post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan were successful. If a key mistake was made, it was the U.S. invasion of Iraq. This pulled crucial resources away from Afghanistan and facilitated the return of warlordism, drug trafficking and Taliban- inspired violence, all of which continue to plague the country.

Sarah Chayes’ fascinating new book, “The Punishment of Virtue,” does much to debunk this conventional narrative. In her multifaceted account, the former NPR reporter details key mistakes made well before the United States was distracted by the Iraq war. Taken together, these mistakes made it exceedingly difficult for Afghanis to achieve basic security and build the relationships of trust upon which a peaceful and prosperous society rests.

As an NPR correspondent, Chayes was based in Kandahar after the city fell to U.S. and Afghani forces in December 2001. Her affection for Kandahar pulses through the book. Repeatedly leaving her account of contemporary events, Chayes delves into the history of the city. She takes us beyond the clichéd images of turbaned, Kalashnikovwielding mujahedeen, burqawrapped women and mud-brick huts to help us understand the strategic importance of Kandahar, its history and culture and, ultimately, why she loves the city and why it is worth loving. This richly colored exposition heightens the reader’s sense of frustration and loss as we see the early opportunity opened by the rout of the Taliban squandered.

It was squandered in part because of what Chayes believes was a stunning mistake: the United States backing Gul Agha Shirzai in the chaotic weeks as Kandahar fell. Shirzai, a regional strongman with violence and corruption in his past, led one of the militia forces that attacked Kandahar. Future President Hamid Karzai led the other. Surprisingly, Shirzai, a “symbol of the arbitrary and bloody madness the populace feared, was the one U.S. advisers had urged on to attack Kandahar and snatch it from Hamid Karzai, the battle-shy mediator.” Emboldened by this support, Shirzai muscled his way into office as governor of Kandahar.

“The Punishment of Virtue” lays out the devastating consequences of this sequence of events, documenting Shirzai’s corrupt, incompetent regime and the role he played in fomenting conflict in the wider region of southern Afghanistan.

In early 2002, Chayes left NPR, but not Afghanistan. Instead, she joined Afghans for Civil Society, a nongovernmental organization. With this job switch, Chayes also switched roles, morphing from outside observer to engaged participant.

Chayes’ account of this phase of her stay, which lasted, except for a few brief interruptions, until 2005, contains one of the book’s most telling contrasts. To find support for Afghans for Civil Society, Chayes made a trip to the United States. The scene she renders is one of quintessential American community activism: fundraisers in private homes, meetings at community centers and churches to raise awareness of Afghanistan’s needs; children rallying to adopt an Afghani school. Chayes was able to draw from America’s “precious well of civil society” and come away with ample moral and financial support for her projects.

But no such well existed back in Afghanistan, and Chayes faced multiple obstacles to fostering community ties through her projects. Tribal patronage made it difficult to create open lines of communication. The bureaucratic inefficiencies of U.S. aid agencies slowed the distribution of needed resources. And Shirzai’s corrupt regime and the thuggery of its officials siphoned precious money, time and energy. These difficulties were magnified by a lack of U.S. policy direction. Chayes reports: “There was no strategy for targeting reconstruction dollars so as to produce the greatest positive domino effect. Worse, there was not even a clear notion of what the desired ‘end state’ in Afghanistan was.

” This incongruity leads to the significant question Chayes’ book raises. As her trip back home reminds us, the United States has a long history of local democracy and community involvement. Yet as the continuing instability in Afghanistan and the burgeoning fiasco in Iraq illustrate, we have been singularly inept at taking what we know so well and fostering democracy elsewhere. Why? Chayes does not provide a definitive answer, but she points us in a certain direction. To foster democracy, security is important. But just as important is a thorough understanding of local politics.

In the end, the strong-willed Chayes sees a number of important projects to completion and contributes to the fragile web of Afghani civil society. But it takes a Herculean effort, a decidedly maverick approach and a thorough understanding of local Kandahari politics. Observing the author acquire this understanding is one of the distinct pleasures of “The Punishment of Virtue.” Her account will be a valuable resource as we continue to struggle with the legacy of our decisions to aggressively pursue the spread of democracy.

John Brady is a writer in Santa Monica.